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JUDGE EDWARDS' INDICTMENT OF 
"IMPRACTICAL" SCHOLARS: THE NEED 
FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Sanford Levinson* 
Judge Harry Edwards' article, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 1 is, at least, two articles in 
one. The first article develops the theme that a serious gap exists be-
tween the work of legal academics and the interests of working judges. 
The second takes up a very different point: the perceived tendency of 
practicing lawyers to be "moving toward pure commerce" and away, 
presumably, from "ethical practice."2 What links these two concerns 
is a view that the contemporary legal academy is straying from its 
traditional mission. In particular, according to Judge Edwards, him-
self a distinguished legal academic prior to his appointment to the 
bench, members of the legal professoriate should devote themselves to 
"training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship that judges, 
legislators, and practitioners can use."3 Law schools do not fulfill this 
mission, in part because of the purported capture of much of the legal 
academy by "[t]he 'impractical' scholar ... [who] produces abstract 
scholarship that has little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses 
concrete issues in a wholly theoretical matter."4 
I have no doubt that Judge Edwards speaks for at least some 
persons within the legal academy and, certainly, many more outside 
those environs. His article has provoked much "faculty-lounge" con-
versation. If truth be known, however, there is nothing particularly 
original about Judge Edwards' initial perceptions,5 which in large 
measure boil down to the well-documented disinclination of an in-
creasing number of legal academics to write about the American legal 
system from the "internal" perspective of the judge or practitioner and 
"' W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, University of 
Texas Law School. - Ed. I am grateful to my colleagues Jack Balkin, Sam Issacharoff, and 
Doug Laycock for their reactions to earlier drafts of this essay. 
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro· 
fession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
2. Id. at 66. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 35. 
5. See, for example, the articles collected in A Symposium on Legal Scholarship, 63 COLO. L. 
REv. 521-750 (1992). 
2010 
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an inclination instead to write for an audience consisting primarily of 
other scholars whose lives are lived "outside" the actual practice of 
law as conventionally defined. 6 The reasons for this development are 
multiple and complex, ranging from the contingencies of political elec-
tions and the "capture" of the judiciary, in the last decade especially, 
by a political party with which most legal academics do not identify, 
to much vaster cultural issues surrounding the concept of "moder-
nity" and "modemization."7 In any event, though, many legal aca-
demics no longer "depend on maintaining unity of discourse with 
practitioners" or "presume to instruct decisionmakers as to what they 
should do."8 Whether or not Judge Edwards seeks "instruction," he 
undoubtedly wishes to force legal scholars tp consider the implications 
of their work. Whatever one thinks of his specific answers, his critique 
of the growing disengagement between scholars and judges raises 
important questions. I am, therefore, grateful to the editors of the 
Michigan Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium. 
Some of my interest in Judge Edwards' article stems from the fact 
that I have taught, in addition to constitutional theory, courses on the 
professional responsibility of lawyers for the past dozen years. I seri-
ously doubt, though, that my identity as a professional responsibility 
teacher explains my presence in this symposium. Surely the most 
likely reason for the editors' invitation is their awareness that Judge 
Edwards focused at least some of his critique on a letter that I had 
written him in 1991 when it seemed that we would appear together at 
a University of Colorado conference on "Constitutional Theory and 
the Practice of Judging."9 He was to comment on a paper that I 
would deliver. 
In that letter,10 I outlined what I proposed to say.11 As I recall, I 
indicated my pleasure in the prospect of our meeting (for the first 
time) in Colorado, in part because I knew from some of his previous 
6. See Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 CoLO. L. REv. 615, 617 
(1992). 
7. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1597, 1627-53 (1991). 
8. Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audi-
ence, 63 COLO. L. REv. 569 (1992). The latter clause quoted from Dan-Cohen suggests also 
what has come to be called the "critique of norrnativity." See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normativity 
and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991). 
9. Edwards, supra note 1, at 36. The proceedings of that conference were published in Ira C. 
Rothgerber, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory and the Practice of 
Judging, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 291-480 (1992). 
10. I did not retain a copy of the letter. The excerpt quoted in the text accompanying note 
14, supra, comes from a quotation from the letter in Judge Edwards' article. 
11. My talk was published as Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-The-
ory {Or, Why, and To Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (1992). 
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writings and speeches at the American Association of Law Schools 
that he was not likely to agree with much, if any, of my approach to 
legal scholarship. As it happened, Judge Edwards was unable to at-
tend the conference; in many ways, though, I view at least part of his 
Michigan Law Review article as the response he might well have given. 
I will therefore focus most of my own remarks on his response to my 
letter. Because it is also relevant to this symposium that I teach pro-
fessional responsibility, I will conclude my remarks by addressing 
some of Judge Edwards' comments about current developments in the 
legal services industry. 
I can summarize my response as follows: Although Judge Ed-
wards' article certainly seems to be leveling a heartfelt indictment, it 
lacks a sufficiently precise bill of particulars to know exactly whom he 
has accused of doing what. Nor does one know exactly what penalty 
Judge Edwards would exact from the miscreants. Unless he supplies 
such a bill, his indictment should be dismissed, though, presumably, 
without prejudice to its reinstatement should he wish to do the hard 
work of supplying evidence for the charges he set out. 
I. PLURALISM AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
Judge Edwards introduces my letter as being from "a well-known 
professor at a prominent law school."12 I do not know why he chose 
not to identify me; perhaps he wanted to "protect" me from being 
identified with what he regards as such fallacious views. In any event, 
the excerpt he quotes is as follows: 
I suppose that we both agree that there is an ever-increasing split 
between the academy and practicing judges (not to mention practicing 
lawyers) .... I presume that a good illustration of the split would be [an 
article of mine] .... Although a couple of cases are mentioned, it is in no 
serious sense meant to be a contribution to the discussion of any of the 
contemporary doctrinal issues of undoubted importance to our society . 
. . . Though I am always delighted to discover that a judge has [read] 
anything I have written . . . I can't honestly say that I expect many 
judicial readers nor am I willing to redirect my writing in ways likely to 
increase the number . 
. . . I view my task as a legal academic as similar more to the member 
of a university department of religion, somewhat detached from the 
practices he/she is studying .... One need not be a devotee of a particu-
lar religion in order to find its practices or doctrines fascinating .... 13 
12. Edwards, supra note 1, at 36. 
13. Id. I do not recall precisely which article I mentioned in the letter. In my published 
article, I referred to two then-recent pieces of mine, Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitu-
tional Change {Or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (a) 
<16; (b) 26; (c) >26; (d) all of the above), 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409 (1991), and Levinson & 
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"I am still astonished," Judge Edwards then writes, "by the profes-
sor's frank admission that he is 'unwilling to redirect' his writing in 
useful ways, since he prefers to study whatever 'fascinates' him."14 
Although "law schools should have interdisciplinary scholars," this 
welcome should not run to "scholars whose work serves no social pur-
pose at all." After all, says Judge Edwards, "[w]e do not give tenure 
to stamp collectors."Is 
Judge Edwards obviously wishes to attack "impractical" scholar-
ship - and the scholars who produce such writing - and to en-
courage instead the writing of "practical" scholarship. He apparently 
defines such scholarship by applying a test of "usefulness" or of "so-
cial purpose," though it is absolutely crucial to note that Judge Ed-
wards defines these terms only from the perspectives of particular 
members of the community, that is, "judges, legislators, and practi-
tioners."16 The central point of his argument, after all, is his dismissal 
of any claims that some particular piece of writing would be of great 
"use" to other members of the scholarly community interested in a 
given theoretical issue. Nor does he seem to support the notion that 
the in-depth development of such issues serves the great "social pur-
pose" to which universities profess their devotion: encouraging learn-
ing as an end in itself. 
To some extent, Judge Edwards is returning to one of the great 
debates of the 1960s - the role of "relevance" in defining the univer-
sity curriculum and assessing the work of members of the university 
community. He firmly rejects an "ivory tower" conception of the uni-
versity in favor of one that emphasizes its utility (or lack of it) to the 
surrounding community. This issue, which is obviously of general im-
portance, is especially salient for those of us involved in the education 
Balkin, supra note 7. I have elaborated on the analogy between law and religion and the concomi-
tant tension presented by viewing the law school as more comparable to a seminary or to a 
secular department of religion in SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 155-57 (1988). 
14. Edwards, supra note 1, at 36. I gather Judge Edwards views it as an admission against 
interest. 
15. Id. (emphasis added). I presume that Judge Edwards means to say that being a stamp 
collector is not a good reason to receive tenure, rather than to suggest that engaging in the 
heretofore honorable hobby of stamp collecting would disqualify someone from receiving tenure. 
The former is true, but it is true as well of being a committed supporter of world peace or a major 
contributor to the American Cancer Society. What one does "off the job" should be irrelevant to 
receiving an academic appointment, particularly one with lifetime job security. As to "on the 
job" conduct, I assume that Judge Edwards would accept the scholarly legitimacy of an article 
treating some of the legal issues that undoubtedly surround stamp collecting, particularly if 
"practicality" is a desiderata of the scholarly endeavor. See, e.g., Stephen R. Field, Collectibles 
as Investments: Artworks and Stamps, 39 INST. ON FED. TAXN. 35-1 (1981); Robson Lowe, 
Marketing a Stamp Collection: It Is the Executor's Responsibility to See that All Items Are Prop-
erly Evaluated and Offered to the Appropriate Market, 120 TR. & EST. 51 (July 1981). 
16. Edwards, supra note l, at 34. 
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of aspiring professionals. I myself have written of the importance of 
remembering that "my primary occupation, for which I am well paid, 
is teaching the young who wish to embark on a life very different from 
mine, i.e., the actual practice oflaw,"17 and I reject any argument that 
legal academics should disregard this reality of our students' lives and 
aspirations. 
Still, not surprisingly, I disagree with much of what Judge Ed-
wards says, at least insofar as I perceive it as an attack on just the sort 
of writing I (often) do. But maybe that perception is itself subject to 
challenge. As already noted, I think that the greatest weakness of 
Judge Edwards' article is its abstraction: for all of its considerable 
passion and polemical overtones, it is often difficult to figure out pre-
cisely what he is arguing. 
One possibility, especially tempting to someone writing a "reply" 
to Judge Edwards, is to view him as denouncing "impractical" schol-
ars and calling in effect for their (or our) expulsion from the legal 
academy. There are certainly passages, for example, that are harshly 
critical of critical legal studies and potentially quite exclusionist in 
their implications.18 As one might readily predict, I would disagree 
wholeheartedly with any such arguments. 
On balance, though, it seems tendentious to ascribe such intoler-
ance to Judge Edwards, for he also expresses support for "interdisci-
plinary" scholarship and his belief in the desirability of pluralistic 
methodologies and approaches to the study of law. Thus, even in re-
gard to critical legal studies, he notes that "[a]t its best, CLS usefully 
questions and challenges the political premises that serve as the foun-
dation of our system of justice"; 19 I assume, therefore, that Judge Ed-
wards would welcome at least some CLS adherents into his scholarly 
universe. 
A more "moderate" reading of Judge Edwards' argument, there-
fore, is simply that the "scholarly law school," which he himself says 
17. LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 165. 
18. See especially Judge Edwards' reference to "some" unnamed CLS scholars as practition-
ers of a clearly unacceptable "legal nihilism." Edwards, supra note 1, at 47. Judge Edwards also 
quotes Paul Carrington's famous suggestion that " '[p]ersons espousing [this] view, however hon-
estly held, have a substantial ethical problem as teachers of professional law students.' " Id. at 47 
n.36 (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 222, 227 (1984)). I 
have offered my own response to Professor Carrington's article in LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 
157-79. 
19. Edwards, supra note 1, at 47 (emphasis added). Judge Edwards writes that "various 
nontraditional movements have the potential to be valuable additions to the law school. CLS 
scholars have provided a critical, anti-establishment view that, in the past, was largely absent 
from the law schools." He goes on to acknowledge the contributions oflaw and economics, law 
and literature, feminism, critical race studies, and moral theory, all of which "usefully inquire 
whether the existing legal system is fundamentally unfair in its construct." Id. at 50. 
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"ideally, should have a balance of 'practical' and 'impractical' profes-
sors"20 has become imbalanced toward the "impractical." Those in 
charge of faculty hiring should presumably compensate for this pur-
ported situation by seeking to secure the proper balance. I am sure 
that Judge Edwards and I disagree about how many "law and" schol-
ars are "too many," but our disagreements might turn out to be more 
marginal than might be anticipated, if closely examined. As a member 
both of the general University of Texas Law School faculty and of its 
appointments committee in particular, I have often voted in favor of 
candidates whose approaches to the study of law, and indeed, concep-
tions of legal education, are not my own, precisely because I value a 
pluralistic legal academy. The same has proved true of many of my 
colleagues, who have little more liking than Judge Edwards for some 
of the directions legal scholarship has taken but nevertheless have ac-
cepted the legitimacy of their presence at the University of Texas. 
But even this more "moderate" argument raises some important 
questions that Judge Edwards does not directly address. I can make 
my point most vividly by noting that the article would have been 
much improved had one been able to ascertain with greater precision 
which legal faculties Judge Edwards would like to see hire which can-
didates. That is, once one rejects the "immoderate" interpretation of 
the article as a call for a general purge of the "impractical," it becomes 
impossible to talk in terms of the legal academy in general. Instead, 
one's analysis must become far more specific and contextual, focusing 
on a particular law school or candidate for a position. As anyone 
knows who lives within the academy, decisions about appointing par-
ticular individuals to our faculties best reveal the concrete meaning of 
our debates about the best way to study law or to engage in any other 
concrete project. 
Consider the fact that the most important action taken by the 
faculty of the University of Michigan Law School in the last decade 
was surely the appointment of Catharine MacK.innon to its ranks. 
Does Judge Edwards applaud that or bewail it? What would he have 
advised - or what did he advise - his friends on the Harvard Law 
School faculty to do in their well-publicized consideration of Professor 
MacK.innon in the spring of 1993?21 How does he view the particular 
mix of interests and intellectual tendencies on those two, or other, 
faculties? 
20. Edwards, supra note l, at 50. 
21. She gained a majority, but not the institutionally required two-thirds, vote to appoint her 
to the Harvard faculty. See Chris Black, Harvard Law Sees Setbacks in Bid To Diversify Its 
Faculty, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1993, at 44. 
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There is at least one problem attached to the specific reference to 
Professor MacKinnon. How, precisely, does one classify her, and 
more importantly, why? Judge Edwards might well have praised her 
work and endorsed her appointment because MacKinnon is in fact 
just the kind of "practical" scholar he is praising. After all, she did 
pioneering work on establishing liability for sexual harassment.22 Fur-
ther, her efforts, albeit extremely controversial, to protect women from 
freely available pornographic material led, in Minneapolis and Indian-
apolis, to the actual passage of legislation23 and stimulated a vital na-
tional debate that millions of Americans - and, no doubt, an 
increasing number of persons worldwide - view as absolutely central 
to the way we organize ourselves socially. It is hard to think of any-
one within the contemporary legal academy whose work has had more 
practical influence, whether for good or for ill. But perhaps Judge 
Edwards would have emphasized instead the formidably theoretical 
aspects of MacKinnon's work24 and thus, in effect, disqualified her 
from further consideration, especially at an "overheated"25 Harvard, 
whose temperature he seems to attribute, at least in part, to its pur-
ported oversupply of impractical theorists. 
MacKinnon obviously explodes the distinction upon which Judge 
Edwards' article rests, at least if one talks about the overall oeuvre of a 
scholar as distinguished from her particular articles.26 It is almost ab-
surd to have to decide whether her work is "practical" or "impracti-
cal," "theoretical" or "doctrinal."27 
22. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). 
23. The legislation, however, was vetoed in Minneapolis, see Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, 
Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 
STAN. L. REv. 607, 644 (1987), and struck down by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Indianapolis. American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), ojfd. mem., 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
24. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989). Judge Edwards notes, without indicating any disagreement, that a former law clerk had 
identified "both Professor Catharine MacKinnon and Judge Richard Posner [as] prominent theo-
rists." Edwards, supra note l, at 47 n.37. Many of the same questions raised about Professor 
MacKinnon's qualifications for membership on an Edwardsian faculty could, of course, also be 
raised about Judge Posner's. 
25. Edwards, supra note 1, at 38. 
26. This is not to suggest that the distinction between "practical" and "impractical" has any 
general theoretical merit. It would be easy enough to show that much highly "theoretical" work, 
deemed "impractical" by its initial audience, turned out, over time, to have significant influence 
on the surrounding culture. 
27. As I write this essay, President Clinton has just withdrawn the nomination of Professor 
Lani Guinier to be Assistant Attorney General in charge of civil rights enforcement, purportedly 
because of his disagreement with the views she expressed in several of her articles concerning 
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments. Does the onslaught 
against Professor's Guinier's views - which, for the record, I find extremely thoughtful - estab-
lish them as (dangerously) "theoretical" and "impractical"? For example, Harvard law profes-
sor Mary Ann Glendon uses Professor Guinier to exemplify the purported emphasis by elite law 
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By failing to discuss the concrete work of a single scholar and by 
focusing instead on isolated comments, such as those in my letter, or 
on the anecdotal musings of his former law clerks, Judge Edwards 
leaves his readers - or at least this reader - confused about his inten-
tions. Still, I hope I have made clear that even the "moderate" version 
of his argument has real consequences for the decisionmaking process 
at law schools interested in retaining some sense of "balance" between 
competing approaches to the study of law and the preparation of stu-
dents for their probable vocation as practicing lawyers. 
Let us assume for the moment that the current "balance" is ac-
ceptable to Judge Edwards and that he is concerned only that there 
are ominous trends bespeaking the shift toward an unacceptable "im-
balance" in favor of "impractical" theory. One might simply trust 
legal academics to know when that point is being reached and to ad-
just accordingly - whatever precisely that means. But Judge Ed-
wards may well not trust existing faculties, especially at the elite 
institutions at which he has taught and from which he draws the over-
whelming number of his law clerks, to make the kinds of adjustments 
he favors. Moreover, he clearly believes that the stakes are enormous. 
Thus I wonder if Judge Edwards, as distinguished from Professor Ed-
wards, is altogether comfortable leaving decisions about faculty hiring 
to the faculty itself if the (im)balance is becoming as dire as he 
suggests. 
Consider, for example, the role that the American Bar Association 
now plays, by invitation rather than by force of law, in the appoint-
ment of federal judges. Declarations of fitness for the office are often 
crucial to appointments. Might Judge Edwards be tempted to advise 
trustees of universities to appoint somewhat similar committees -
consisting of judges, legislators, administrators, and selected practi-
tioners - who could offer their own assessments of the current "bal-
ance" of faculty members or of the "usefulness" of the scholarship 
likely to be produced by particular candidates for appointment? If 
Judge Edwards would resist such a suggestion, I would like to know 
why, at least if he believes his own argument about the social conse-
quences of the legal academy's going further down the particular path 
faculties on theory rather than practice. Thus she writes that "[t]he roots of [Guinier's] difficul-
ties lie in a legal academic establishment that is woefully out of touch with American culture and 
political life" and that exhibits "[a] growing disdain for the practical aspects oflaw [and] a zany 
passion for novelty." Mary A. Glendon, What's Wrong With the Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., 
June 8, 1993, at A14. If, as I think is likely, Judge Edwards agrees with the overall description, 
then it seems logical to ask him if Professor Guinier's appointment to law schools like Harvard 
or Michigan would (further) make them unacceptably imbalanced. If Judge Edwards believes 
that this is an unfair question, he should explain why. 
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of the law that so perturbs him. If Judge Edwards would in fact em-
brace my suggestion, then his views are indeed a pernicious attack on 
hard-won faculty autonomy. 
II. MOTIVATION AND SCHOLARSHIP 
If Judge Edwards writes ambiguously about the actual welcome he 
would give those whose approaches to law are very different from his 
own, his argument is quite definite and readily comprehensible con-
cerning what should (not) motivate scholars. As noted earlier, he ob-
jects vehemently to my comment that I write about what "fascinates" 
me. It seems clear that Judge Edwards was himself fascinated - or, 
more accurately, appalled - by my use of the word "fascinating," for 
later in his article he states that" '[p]erscmal fascination' is not a suffi-
cient justification for scholarship, of any kind. " 28 
This may be the most telling difference between us, for "fascina-
tion," I believe, is at the heart of the scholarly vocation or, indeed, 
almost any truly enjoyable life. It is intended to evoke what a more 
explicitly Marxist thinker might have termed "unalienated" labor, 
that is, choosing one's own work because it satisfies one's internal 
needs for self-development - including the need to understand one's 
world - rather than responding to the external demands of dominant 
others.29 Judge Edwards' denigration of the importance of "fascina-
tion" - indeed, of its very legitimacy - is what is most truly dis-
turbing, even authoritarian, about his article. 
To be sure, I agree with Judge Edwards that "fascination" is not a 
sufficient condition to embark on a scholarly project or, more cer-
tainly, to praise the choice of a topic,30 but this concession is surely 
trivial. I know of no one inane enough to argue the opposite. Inevita-
bly, we assess the importance of a topic when assessing the work of a 
scholar; as my colleague Louise Weinberg has remarked, we often rate 
our colleagues by a quality that she terms "taste" in the choices they 
make of topics to study. "Taste" refers not to norms of etiquette, but 
to an ability to identify and then illuminate significant problems. We 
legitimately hold it against someone that he or she is not "fascinated" 
by such problems, though it is the achievement of truly generative 
scholars to recognize the importance of problems previously dismissed 
as insignificant. Of course, as suggested earlier, different communities 
28. Edwards, supra note 1, at 56. 
29. See, e.g., KARL MARX, THE EcONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, ex-
cerpted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 70-81 (Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
30. Id. at 56. 
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might be "fascinated" by different problems, as is presumptively the 
case with judges, on the one hand, and legal academics, on the other. 
Surely it is that difference in what fascinates, rather than fascina-
tion itself, that is at the heart of the controversy between Judge Ed-
wards and scholars like myself. It is almost bizarre to hold it against 
someone, as Judge Edwards appears to do, that "fascination" plays an 
important role in explaining a decision to allocate one's scarce time 
and energy to studying one problem rather than another. Judge Ed-
wards defines the legal scholar basically as a consultant or uniquely 
high-level research assistant available for hire to work on problems 
assigned by "practitioners, judges, administrators, or legislators."31 
Although the scholar may be autonomous in the sense of being for-
mally uncontrolled by the judge or practitioner, there is, otherwise, 
precious little autonomy in Judge Edwards' vision. The Edwardsian 
scholar is, to adopt a phrase from the language of professional respon-
sibility, an "officer of the court" - or a de facto member of the prac-
ticing bar - subject in effect to the direction of the judge or the 
managing partner concerning what problems to consider, even if not 
necessarily what specific arguments to craft. 
This may be, to be sure, a caricature of Judge Edwards' view, but I 
do not believe it is a fundamentally unfair interpretation of the criteria 
his article offers to determine whether the requisite degree of "practi-
cality" is present in a scholar's work. I would love Judge Edwards to 
inform me that I fundamentally misunderstand his argument on this 
point, that he is in fact not hostile to the idea that scholars should be 
"fascinated" by what they study, and that the presence of such "fasci-
nation" should be a necessary, even if certainly not a sufficient, condi-
tion of a fulfilling life as a legal scholar - or as anything else. 
III. "PRACTICALITY," "IMPRACTICALITY," AND THE 
DEGRADATION OF LEGAL PRACTICE 
As noted earlier, some of the most interesting passages in Judge 
Edwards' article concern his vision of legal practice, both as ideal and 
as instantiated in current practice. Thus he writes that "[t]he ethical 
lawyer should only advance reasonable interpretations of the authori-
tative texts - interpretations that are plausible from a public-regard-
ing point of view."32 This is, to put it mildly, not what the actual 
31. Id. at 47. It is worth noting that Judge Edwards does not include in his list of acceptable 
reference groups "dissident organizations,'' "community groups,'' and the like, though he might 
well reply that the term "practitioners" is sufficiently all-embracing to include those who minis-
ter to such groups. 
32. Id. at 59. 
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practice of law reveals, however, and he seems to suggest that the ever-
increasing deviation from this aspirational norm is ascribable to the 
increasing presence of "impractical theoreticians" in the legal acad-
emy. "[S]cholars," Judge Edwards informs us, "who attend to con-
crete legal problems in their scholarship, and ideally have practiced 
law themselves, are much better suited to teach law students what eth-
ical practice means."33 He then quotes Paul Carrington's suggestion 
that teachers who are " 'seen by students to be disengaged from polit-
ical reality and the humdrum affairs of professional life may be disad-
vantaged'" - "indeed, will be disadvantaged," Judge Edwards adds 
- " 'in the effort to inculcate moral standards applicable to profes-
sional thinking and conduct in public roles.' "34 
I put to one side the problems involved in defining what might 
count as engagement in "political reality," though heaven help us if it 
is limited to the definitions that might be offered even by distinguished, 
and relatively liberal, federal judges like Judge Edwards. As Judge 
Edwards himself admits, however, immersion in the "humdrum affairs 
of professional life" scarcely seems to provide any kind of immuniza-
tion against the various viruses of moral misconduct. 
The very first page of his article, after all, includes the statement 
that "[m]any law firms ... pursu[e] profit above all else" and are 
therefore "moving toward pure commerce" and away from "ethical 
practice."35 Elsewhere he writes, altogether accurately, that "many 
law firms have transformed themselves into 'money machines,' " 
where "[m]aterialistic goals ... overcome ethical considerations in pri-
vate practice."36 Judge Edwards thus writes of the "institutional pres-
sures" placed on "altruistic individuals" practicing within the "typical 
materialistic law firm ... to behave in a materialistic,'' and presuma-
bly less than truly ethical, fashion. 37 Indeed, it should be clear, even 
to those who did not read the original article, that it is replete with 
what can only be described as harshly critical commentary concerning 
the contemporary practice of law, supported sometimes by reference 
to the comments of Judge Edwards' former law clerks.38 Thus, as a 
final example, Judge Edwards suggests that law firms will often teach 
their new associates "to misconstrue cases and statutes, to write obfus-
33. Id. at 74. 
34. Id. (quoting Paul Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teaching in a 
Democracy, 41 DUKE L.J. 741, 791 (1992) (emphasis added)). 
35. Edwards, supra note 1, at 34. 
36. Id. at 68. 
37. Id. at 71. 
38. See, e.g., id. at 68-71. 
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catory briefs, [and] to overpaper a case .... "39 
I have no disagreement with Judge Edwards about a single sen-
tence quoted in the previous paragraph. Whatever the explanation, 
one need only read The American Lawyer or, increasingly, the front 
pages of the New York Times or Wall Street Journal to realize that a 
culture dominated by maximization of profit and "the bottom line" 
has created a class of lawyers who, invoking the professional maxim of 
"zealous advocacy,"40 seem remarkably uninterested in the "public-
regarding" implications of their arguments. I might note that the le-
gitimacy of this indifference has been defended by some notable schol-
ars, 41 not to mention distinguished practitioners.42 
One would scarcely know this, though, from reading Judge Ed-
wards, so eager is he to pin the blame for our present discontents on 
the "impractical" or "theoretical" scholar. Thus Judge Edwards re-
places my ellipsis at the conclusion of the paragraph above with the 
assertion that the kind of (mis)education he denounces "will be all the 
smoother if [young associates] studied only pure theory in law 
school. "43 I would be astonished if there were even the proverbial 
scintilla of evidence to support this assertion or the linked proposition 
that teachers of the type approved by Judge Edwards are more suc-
cessful in inculcating "correct" ethical norms than are teachers like 
myself- assuming that I am not the "type" most cherished by Judge 
Edwards. Indeed, Judge Edwards' attempt to blame "impractical" 
academics for the present ethical state of the legal services industry 
would be laughable if it were not otherwise so pathetically misleading 
as a diagnosis of our present discontents. 
At the very least, Judge Edwards presents no genuine evidence 
about the actual ways that "impractical" scholars teach their legal 
profession courses, nor does he address the specific inadequacies of 
any of our syllabi. Perhaps, though, the point is that syllabi - and the 
39. Id. at 39. 
40. See, for example, the "Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities," to the American Bar 
Association's, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that "[a]s advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5 (1992). 
41. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical 
Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. Professor 
Fried, of course, went on to become Solicitor General of the United States, and there is no reason 
to believe that legal practice has led him to recant the views expressed in his 1976 essay. 
42. See, e.g., Charles Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951); see also Ray 
Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L. REV. 909, 918 (1980) 
("The prevailing notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client 
is the first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only duty of the lawyer.") (emphasis added). 
43. Edwards, supra note 1 at 39. 
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actual content of one's ideas - do not matter, that only someone with 
experience in the trenches oflegal practice, whom students perceive as 
"practfoal," could possibly reach students and therefore serve as an 
effective teacher and role model. There may be some truth to this 
proposition, but one needs evidence for it rather than raw, unsup-
ported assertions about complex reality. One hopes that Judge Ed-
wards, when hearing criminal appeals, asks more by way of evidence 
in regard to the indictments brought by prosecutors or the convictions 
they gain from juries. 
More is involved in this debate, though, than the sociology of the 
legal services industry, as important as that is. There are also, dare I 
say it, issues oflaw and legal interpretation. How does Judge Edwards 
read some of the existing statutory law governing lawyers? Consider, 
for example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 
38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procequre, both of which pro-
hibit lawyers from offering "frivolous" legal arguments in the course 
of litigation. 44 Should one read these statutes, and related rules of pro-
fessional conduct, 45 to require lawyers, on pain of sanctions and even 
potential disbarment, to refuse to present any arguments that they find 
"[un]reasonable interpretations of the authoritative texts" or that are 
otherwise "[im]plausible from a public-regarding point of view"?46 I 
do not think one has to believe in radical indeterminacy in order to 
find these notions to be "void for vagueness"47 rather than serious 
norms designed to guide lawyers in doing their work. I certainly in-
vite Judge Edwards to visit my course on the legal profession and to 
teach my students the "real" meaning of the relevant federal rules or 
bar codes of conduct. 
Consider one more example, the meaning to be assigned 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1813(u), which involves the liability of an "institution-affiliated 
party" for "any violation of any law or regulation" or "any unsafe or 
unsound practice" that "is likely to cause more than a minimal finan-
cial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on," an "insured depository 
44. See Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All? 24 
0SGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986). 
45. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1992). 
46. Edwards, supra note 1, at 59. The only Rule 11 case on which Judge Edwards has wri~­
ten, Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1990), involved a lawyer's insufficient 
efforts to determine the existence of facts asserted by the client prior to filing the complaint 
alleging them. There was little doubt that the claim would have been at least nonfrivolous had 
the facts been as the client alleged. 
47. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, 109 u. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
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institution."48 It was this statute, among others, that served as the 
basis of charges brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) of 
the United States Department of the Treasury against various partners 
of the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. The 
charges related to the firm's representation of the management of Lin-
coln Savings Bank, which catastrophically mismanaged the institution 
and contributed significantly to the general savings and loan crisis of 
the late 1980s.49 Among the charges OTS alleged was that the firm 
should have disclosed to the Bank's board of directors information 
about the highly questionable banking practices in which the manage-
ment of the Bank was engaged. 
Although the law firm settled with OTS by agreeing to pay forty-
one million dollars, it resolutely denied any wrongdoing. Among the 
most interesting paragraphs in Kaye, Scholer's Response to OTS' No-
tice of Charges50 is the following: 
... Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., of the Yale Law School, the na-
tion's foremost authority on legal ethics, is of the opinion that Kaye 
Scholer was not required to disclose to the Bank Board client confi-
dences or to provide .to the Bank Board possible adverse characteriza-
tions of Lincoln's conduct. On the contrary, it is .Professor Hazard's 
opinion that: 
The disclosures and representations that the OTS alleges should have 
been made to the Bank Board by Kaye Scholer in fact would have 
violated the standards of ethical conduct and professional responsibil-
ity generally recognized as applicable to Kaye Scholer in its role as 
litigation counsel. 51 
To put it mildly, I am curious about Judge Edwards' view of Professor 
Hazard's legal analysis for Kaye Scholer and, should he disagree with 
it, Judge Edwards' willingness to ascribe it to Hazard's generally "im-
practical" or "theoretical" orientation toward the analysis of what the 
48. See 12 u.s.c. § 1813(u) (1988), quoted in STEVEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON JR., The 
Kaye Scholer File, in REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 732 (1993). 
49. For the general facts, see GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 48, at 729-32. The OTS com-
plaint is reprinted in id. at 734-72. The Kaye, Scholer episode has already generated substantial 
literature. See, e.g., In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on 
Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 977 (1993). 
SO. The response is reprinted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 48, at 772-78. 
51. Id. at 773. Professor Hazard is also the director of the American Law Institute, not 
heretofore identified with the "impractical" or "theoretical" wing of the academy castigated by 
Judge Edwards- although, by way of disclosure, I should note that I have been a member of the 
A.L.I. since 1986. 
The New York Times apparently agreed with Professor Hazard, editorializing that the gov-
ernment was in effect making "novel demands that the lawyers abandon their customary loyalty 
to clients." Accountability by Sledgehammer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A24, quoted in 
Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1075, 1075 n.2. Professor Koniak cited statements by other defenders of the firm, 
though she notes that there were many critics as well. See Koniak, supra, at 1075 n.3. 
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American Law Institute terms "the law governing lawyers. "52 
The obvious problem facing anyone trying to think seriously about 
the practices of contemporary American lawyers is that there is wide 
divergence within the professional legal community about what kinds 
of inferences one can "reasonably" draw from "authoritative legal 
texts," not to mention a potentially wider divergence as to what con-
stitutes a truly "public-regarding point of view" about any concrete 
issue of the day. I dare say that most practicing lawyers would, for 
better or worse, find Judge Edwards' comments about the duty of the 
ethical attorney to be hopelessly abstract and impractical - though 
this is certainly not a good reason to reject his overall message about 
the nature of contemporary legal practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
So where does this leave us? Are Judge Edwards and I implacable 
foes (doubtful) or uneasy allies (just as doubtful)? Or, more likely, 
might we sometimes be one, and sometimes the other? For better or 
worse, the only way to find out is by addressing specific examples. To 
paraphrase Justice Holmes:53 "General propositions do not [make] 
concrete cases."54 That insight is no less true for such potentially va-
porous abstractions as "practicality" and "impracticality" than for the 
meaning of "due process of law." 
52. This is the title given to the restatement project underway regarding the duties of practic-
ing lawyers. 
53. By the way, in which box - "practical" or "impractical" - would we put most of his 
scholarship? · 
54. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905). 
